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Introduction
Unemployment benefits have become a prominent institution in European countries. However,
they are accused of creating disincentives to job search and therefore of increasing the length of
unemployment spells. Empirical studies footnote  have found a positive relation between the degree
of persistence of unemployment and with the duration for which unemployment benefits are payable.
The perverse effects of unemployment benefits are present also on the demand side of the labor
market footnote . Unemployment benefits make firms more reluctant in hiring new employees
because of the negative effect they have on equilibrium reservation values, reducing firms return
from extra hiring. The abolition of unemployment compensation would certainly remove both the
search disincentive and the hiring disincentive effects. However, it may also introduce some other
kind of inefficiencies, specially in the presence of imperfections in other markets or of externalities.
If agents are risk-averse and financial markets are incomplete, i.e. borrowing is either limited or
exogenously precluded, unemployment benefits become an efficient insurance scheme against
idiosyncratic risk, as shown in Flemming  cite: sei  footnote . Moreover, as shown in Wright
 cite: ventiquattro , unemployment benefits may be socialized via the electoral process, even if
insurance technologies are available in the economy. In Marimon and Zilibotti  cite: quatordici ,
unemployment insurance allows workers to spend more time in looking for the most suitable job.
The misallocation of resources to mismatch is subsequently reduced when a skill-biased
technological change is introduced.
These two facts lead to unambiguous policy recommendation: search and/or hiring incentives
have to be restored within an unemployment insurance scheme, so as to reduce existent
inefficiencies without introducing new ones.
In Easley, Kiefer and Possen  cite: cinque , both the relative and joint performances of
unemployment insurance and negative income tax systems are assessed. Wright  cite: ventiquattro 
finds that unemployment benefits should decline with the duration of unemployment. Hopenayn and
Nicolini  cite: otto  look at the features of an optimal unemployment insurance contract in an
environment where the probability to find a new job depends on the search effort made by the agent.
In this model the principal (e.g. the government) does not observe workers’ search effort. The
authors first, find, like Wright  cite: ventiquattro , that the level of unemployment benefits should be
a decreasing sequence. Second, the tax rate after re-employment should increase with the length of
the unemployment spell. The latter unemployment insurance and tax schemes are efficient in terms
of search incentives but may have mitigated results if adverse selection is taken into account.
Pissarides  cite: dicianove  demonstrates how progressive income taxes can be used to offset the
search disincentive effects of unemployment insurance. Such taxes have to be coupled with a search
subsidy when the search effort is not fixed but perfectly observable. In this taxation framework,
high-paying jobs become less attractive exerting downward pressure on the reservation wage.
Indeed, progressive income tax lowers the expected return of employment, and thus discourages the
unemployed from searching. Ljungqvist and Sargent  cite: undici  explore the role of search
incentives in explaining the various unemployment experiences of European welfare states. They
assess the effects of a progressive income tax scheme on the national product and unemployment
rates. Their modelling exhibits a trade-off between a higher search effort and aggregate efficiency.
By introducing some kind of government control over the unemployed, they are able to explain howlow unemployment can be coupled with generous unemployment policies.
Labor subsidies are instruments able to fit the above policy recommendation. Labor subsidies are
thought to be the right stimulus to employment inflow footnote . They are an active employment
policy, in the sense that they aim at stimulating employment footnote . A peculiar form of labor
subsidies are the so-called employment vouchers. They differ from other general employment
subsidies in the sense that they are paid only to unemployed workers. To all intents and purposes
they act as a marginal employment (or, more strictly, hiring) subsidy for an unemployed worker.
Thus, persistence in unemployment can be curbed, as it is commonly recognized that the probability
of being retained is larger than the probability of being fired. In addition, employment vouchers are
thought to be an appropriate way of dealing with market failures that lead to excessive real wages
and thereby depress the labor demand. They are an efficient instrument for reducing labor costs
regardless of the source of such excessive costs footnote . Employment vouchers are subsidies for
hiring unemployed workers, and they can be implemented through a wide variety of policy
instruments. It is generally argued that they may be indifferently granted to employers and
employees. In practice, they principally correspond to targeted subsidies, that is, only particular
groups of unemployed are provided with, and are generally cashed in by the employers. There is
little “empirical“ evidence about the effects of employment vouchers on search intensity. Woodbury
and Spielgelman  cite: ventitre  and Dubin and Rivers  cite: quattro  have made some experimental
estimates of the impact of wage subsidies and of search bonuses footnote . One of their main results
is that both of the previous policies have a positive impact, but upon different segments of the labor
force. In Orszag and Snower  cite: diciotto , the potential short-run and long-run effect of vouchers
on employment are analyzed within a partial equilibrium set up. Deadweight and displacement
effects are introduced together with a specific governmental budget constraint such that no net cost
is imposed on tax payers. They use a two-state Markovian process to characterize the employment
opportunities, and both hiring and firing probabilities are functions of the voucher level. The optimal
level of voucher to be ascribed is positively correlated with the level of benefit and negatively linked
to the dead weight and displacement costs. This optimal level corresponds to both short-run and
long-run improvements in the level of employment footnote . However, incentives compatible
schemes can not be assessed in this kind of framework.
In this paper employment vouchers take the form either of a search subsidy ( interpreted as a
search bonus) paid to the unemployed worker once she has found a job, and decreasing with the
length of the unemployment spell footnote , or of a hiring subsidy cashed in by the firm once a new
worker has been hired. Both instruments affect agents’ decisions and consequently equilibrium
values. In particular, search subsidies may stimulate at the first place search effort, as found in Dubin
and Rivers  cite: quattro , and hiring subsidies the hiring willingness of firms. It is also clear that
more intensive job search is unable to create new jobs on its own while hiring subsidies may.
However, in terms of the Beveridge curve, which relates vacancies to unemployment, a larger search
effort may shift it in. Indeed, both the shape and the position of the Beveridge curve are influenced
by the search behavior of the unemployed. For many European countries a shift-out of the curve has
been observed footnote . Therefore, a higher level of job search may help to recover a lower rate of
unemployment as much as hiring subsidies may stimulate employment.
The approach is to build an equilibrium search model, with stochastic job matching and variable
search intensity, so as to imitate the employment law of motion and to assess welfare indicators. I
first attempt to identify a trade-off between lower unemployment, and cost effectiveness and/or
aggregate efficiency, and then to assess the relative performance of the two policy instruments in
terms of this trade-off footnote . Conditions for cost effectiveness to be obtained exist for both
instruments. Nevertheless, instruments are expected to lead to contrasting results in terms ofaggregate efficiency. In particular hiring subsidies expected to reduce reservation values while
search subsidies are expected to increase them. The computational exercise shows that hiring
subsidies tend to dampen aggregate efficiency more than search subsidies do, making the above
trade-off to large to be socially viable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the benchmark
economy. Steady state and optimum conditions for the policy augmented economies are shown in
section 3. Section 4 presents some sufficient conditions for cost effectiveness to be obtained, as well
as the corresponding optimal values of policy instruments. Section 5 considers efficiency and
aggregate welfare indicators. Section 6 contains the computational strategy followed to find steady




There are many ex-ante identical workers and many ex-ante identical firms, and each operates as
an atomistic competitor. Workers are either unemployed or brought together with a firm by a
job-matching technology. Unemployed workers are searching for jobs at a positive cost and firms are
recruiting through vacancy creation. Frictions arise in the economy because, ex-post, the
productivity of a job-worker pair is a random drawing from a probability distribution gÂJÃ known by
both agents. However, once contact between the firm and the worker is made, the productivity of the
match is known with certainty. There is an ex-post match-specific heterogeneity. This is referred to
as stochastic job matching. Workers are assumed to be separated from jobs following a Poisson
process with rate denoted s. Firms decide whether to open or not a vacancy v while workers choose
search intensity c. There is also a common choice variable, the reservation productivity Jr below
which neither the firm nor the worker will want to trade. Matching occurs at the aggregate level, at a
rate Â1 ? GÂJrÃÃMÂcu,vÃ, where u is unemployment and cu can be defined as the “efficiency units”
of searching workers. The matching technology MÂcu,vÃ has the standard properties. It is assumed to
be increasing in both its arguments, concave, and homogenous of degree 1. Let us define the v:u
ratio as the labor market tightness and let us denote it by S. The process that changes the state of
vacant jobs is Poisson with rate
qÂS,c,JrÃ = Â1 ? GÂJrÃÃmÂ cu
v ,1Ã   #   
The representative unemployed workers footnote  move into employment according to a Poisson
process with rate
pÂS,c,JrÃ = Â1 ? GÂJrÃÃmÂc,SÃ   #   
p and q are related by pÂS,c,JrÃ = SqÂS,c,JrÃ. Both p and q are increasing in an exogenous rise
in c, and decreasing in an exogenous rise in Jr.
At the steady state equilibrium, the flow into unemployment is equal to the flow into
employment, that is
sÂ1 ? uÃ = SqÂS,c,JrÃu   #   
Thus, assuming that the labor market is large enough so that deviations from the mean can be
ignored, the rate of unemployment is given byu = s
s + SqÂS,c,JrÃ
  #   
1
u can be interpreted as the time that the typical worker will spend unemployed over an infinite
working life. Indeed, as s is the exit rate from employment and SqÂS,c,JrÃ is the rate at which
workers transit from unemployment to employment, the representative worker‘s unemployment
history is a Markov chain where u is the ergodic probability of unemployment.
Firms
We assume that firms are small and each has one job that is either vacant or occupied by a
worker. When the job is occupied the firm produces output Jy, where y is a fixed value as we
assume that labor is the only production factor. When it is vacant, the firm is actively engaging at a
cost Lwe where we is the average wage in the economy. Firms return a worker at a rate equal to the
transition rate for vacant jobs. Let V be the present discounted value of expected profit from a vacant
job and J the present discounted value of expected profit from an occupied job. At steady state, V
and J satisfy
rV = ?Lwe + qÂS,c,JrÃÂJe ? VÃ   #   
rJ = Jy ? w + sÂV ? JÃ   #   
Following Pissarides  cite: venti  the zero-profit or free entry condition V = 0 is made in order to
close the model. The latter condition means that vacancies adjust instantaneously to eliminate pure
profits or losses attributable to keeping a job vacant. It implies that
Je = Lwe
qÂS,c,JrÃ
  #   
There is a reservation productivity Jf such that all Jh  Jf are accepted. The reservation
productivity of the firm is defined by condition J = 0. Hence, from equation ( ref: fiv )
Jfy ? wf = 0   #   
Taking the conditional expectation of ( ref: fiv ) and introducing ( ref: six ) we obtain the
condition for jobs
Jey ? we ? Âr + sÃ Lwe
qÂS,c,JrÃ
= 0   #   
Workers
We are interested in the behavior of the representative worker. In equilibrium all unemployed
workers search with the same search intensity noted c. It is further assumed that unemployed
workers undertake their own job search, supplying their own hours. Time available is normalized to
unity. Hence, the leisure time available to the unemployed worker is 1 ? hÂcÃ where hvÂcÃ > 0a n d
hvvÂcÃ  0 footnote . The imputed value of leisure time to the worker is set proportional to the
after-tax wage rate. Income during unemployment is then given by XÄ1 ? hÂcÃÅÂ1 ? tbÃwe, where
Xv > 0a n dXvv ) 0. In the theoretical derivations that follow, we assume for convenience, and
without any loss of generality, that hvvÂcÃ = 0a n dXvv = 0. Unemployed workers also receive some
unemployment benefits _Â1 ? tbÃwe of non limited duration footnote . Thus, the valuation placed onunemployment is given by
rU = ÂXÄ1 ? hÂcÃÅ+ _ÃÂ1 ? tbÃwe + pÂS,c,JrÃÂEe ? UÃ   #   
Taxation is proportional and the tax rate is chosen such that, at equilibrium, tax revenue covers
expenditures on unemployment benefits. That is
_Â1 ? tbÃu = tÂ1 ? uÃ   #   
The net worth of being employed is given by
rE = Â1 ? tbÃw + sÂU ? EÃ   #   
where again s is the exogenous separation rate.
rU represents the permanent income of an unemployed worker, that is, the minimum
compensation that an unemployed worker requires to accept a job offer. This corresponds to the
definition of the reservation wage, the minimum wage that an unemployed worker would accept.
wr = rU   #   
From equation ( ref: nine ) and conditional expectations of ( ref: ten ) we obtain that
wr
we = ÄÂr + sÃÄXÄ1 ? hÂcÃÅ+ _Å + pÂS,cJrÃÅÂ1 ? tbÃ
r + s + pÂS,c,JrÃ
  #   
Provided that the condition /we
/wr
wr
we < 1 is satisfied, standard partial comparative statics are
verified. Under this assumption an exogenous rise in the right-hand side of equation ( ref: twelve )
raises the reservation wage. That is, replacement ratio _ raises the reservation wage while search
cost reduces it.
The First Order Condition for c is given by
hvÂcÃXvÄ1 ? hÂcÃÅ = Â1 ? XÄ1 ? hÂcÃÅ? _Ã
r + s + pÂS,c,JrÃ
pÂS,c,JrÃ
c   #   
The left hand side represents the net loss of extra search effort, while the right hand side
represents the discounted net gain of extra search effort. As usual, the replacement ratio affects
negatively search effort. The tax rate does not appear in the above equation as it affects identically
both net income from work and the share of labor in the bargain over wage, as shown in equation
( ref: fourteen ).
Wages
The equilibrium wage is derived from a Nash Bargain between firms and workers when they
meet. It maximizes the weighted product of the worker’s and firm’s net return from the job
w
max ÂE ? UÃKÂJ ? VÃ1?K
s.tE+ J ? U ? V = S
Where S stands for the surplus of the match. Search cost and unemployment benefits are
proportional to the average wage in the economy at that moment in time. The wage offer a particular
unemployed worker may get has no effect on the average net worth of unemployment.The First Order Condition for w gives
K /E
/w
ÂJ ? VÃ + Â1 ? KÃ /J
/w
ÂE ? UÃ = 0
That is,
E ? U = KÂ1 ? tbÃ
1 ? K ÂJ ? VÃ   #   
By imposing the equilibrium condition V = 0, and by substituting ( ref: nine ) and ( ref: ten )
into the left hand side of expression ( ref: fourteen ), ( ref: four ) and ( ref: fiv ) into the right hand
side, we obtain the equation for the average wage
we = KJey
ÄKÂ1 ? SLÃ ? Â1 ? KÃÂXÄ1 ? hÂcÃÅ+ _ ? 1ÃÅ
  #   
Equilibrium
It is now straightforward to define equilibrium conditions. The equilibrium unemployment is
defined by equation ( ref: three ). The reservation productivity is obtained by substituting wr and we




ÂXÄ1 ? hÂcÃÅ+ _ÃÂ1 ? tbÃÂ1 ? KÃ + KSL
ÄKÂ1 ? SLÃ ? Â1 ? KÃÂXÄ1 ? hÂcÃÅ+ _ ? 1ÃÅ




we < 1 implies that /Je
/Jr
Jr
Je < 1 is verified. Again, a rise in the right-hand side
will raise the reservation productivity. Hence, the replacement ratio will raise the reservation
productivity implying that in this framework it becomes a shift variable in the relationship between v
and u.
The tightness condition is obtained by introducing expression ( ref: fifteen ) into the jobs
condition ( ref: eight )
Â1 ? KÃÂ1 ? XÄ1 ? hÂcÃÅ? _Ã ? KSL ? Âr + sÃ
qÂS,c,JrÃ
KL = 0   #   
Using the outcome of the Nash Bargaining, the condition for optimal search effort is
chvÂcÃXvÄ1 ? hÂcÃÅ = K
1 ? K LS   #   
The system is recursive. Equations ( ref: sixteen ), ( ref: seventeen ) and ( ref: eighteen ) give the
steady state values for Jr, c, S. With knowledge of these variables equation ( ref: three ) gives the
equilibrium rate of unemployment. Moreover, by differentiating equations ( ref: seventeen ) and
( ref: eighteen ) with respect to the reservation productivity we find that the effects Jr has on them
cancel each other out, so equations ( ref: seventeen ) and ( ref: eighteen ) are independent of Jr.
Hence, they can be solved for S and c. As represented in  ref: fign , uniqueness of equilibrium is





Equilibrium search intensity and tightness
In a Âu,vÃ space, equation ( ref: three ) gives the so called Beveridge curve or UV curve. As it is
usually assumed in the theoretical literature, we assume here that the effects operating through the
probability to make a contact, namely the search effect and the vacancy effect dominate the effect
operating through the rejection of a job offer, namely the reservation-wage effect. Because of this
assumption, which has found strong empirical support footnote , and because of the assumed
properties of the matching function the UV curve is downward sloping and convex to the origin. The
“production side” of the economy is represented by the so-called VS curve, hinging on equation
( ref: twentyseven ). By setting S = v
u , and by introducing equation ( ref: three ), we obtain a
relation between v and u that is upward sloping if
u < s
2s + r
which is certain to be satisfied for values of r small enough.
Policy Instruments
We consider two policy instruments apart from unemployment benefits and wage taxes paid by
the worker in order to finance the policy, namely search subsidies and employment subsidies. Search
subsidies are cashed in by the worker once she has accepted an offer. Hiring subsidies are paid to the
firm for each new worker it hires. These two instruments would have equivalent qualitative effects
within a framework where search intensity is hold constant and matching is not stochastic. However,
when the theoretical framework is enriched by assuming that search intensity can vary and matching
is assumed to be stochastic, then, as will be shown below, it makes a difference to whom the
employment subsidy is paid.
Search Subsidies
Actual search subsidy is defined by
pÂS,c,JrÃVÂ1 ? tsÃwe   #   
Actual search subsidy is then increasing in search effort as the transition rate is increasing in
search effort.
Search effort is not perfectly observable. Hence, from a practical point of view, search bonuses
are conceivable only if they take the form of a lump sum transfer. However, search effort affectsdirectly the length of unemployment spell, which is perfectly observable by governmental
authorities. Indeed, in all the European countries, unemployed workers have to register at an
unemployment agency in order to draw unemployment compensation. Thus, in the above economy,
the longer they stayed unemployed the smaller the voucher they receive. If unemployment
compensations are provided only for a finite period of time, a policy scheme equivalent to the above
search subsidy scheme would be to allow the unemployed worker who finds a job before the
expiration date of the compensation payment, to cash in, as a lump sum bonus, the amount of
unemployment compensation she would have been paid if she had stayed unemployed for the all
duration of benefits.
The permanent income expression becomes
rU = ÂXÄ1 ? hÂcÃÅ+ _ÃÂ1 ? tsÃwe + ÂpÂS,c,JrÃVÃÂ1 ? tsÃwe + pÂS,c,JrÃÂEe ? UÃ   #   
and the reservation wage is now
wr
we = ÄÂr + sÃÄXÄ1 ? hÂcÃÅ+ _Å + pÂS,c,JrÃÂ1 + VÃÅÂ1 ? tsÃ
r + s + pÂS,c,JrÃ




we < 1,search subsidy increases the reservation wage.
The condition for optimal search is now given by
hvÂcÃXvÄ1 ? hÂcÃÅ? pÂS,c,JrÃ
c V = Ä1 ? XÄ1 ? hÂcÃÅ? _ ? pÂS,c,JrÃVÅ
r + s + pÂS,c,JrÃ
pÂS,c,JrÃ
c   #   
By comparing equation ( ref: thirteen ) with equation ( ref: twentytwo ), the introduction of
search subsidies leads to a higher level of search intensity, holding other variables constant.
Hiring Subsidies
Subsidies are paid to the firm for each new worker it hires. Actual hiring subsidy can be
expressed as
qÂS,c,JrÃewe   #   
The firm’s net worth from a job is then
rV = ?ÂL ? qÂS,c,JrÃeÃwe + qÂS,c,JrÃÂJe ? VÃ   #   
The condition for jobs is now
Jey ? we ? Âr + sÃ ÂL ? qÂS,c,JrÃeÃwe
qÂS,c,JrÃ
= 0   #   
Hiring subsidies are different from wage subsidies in the sense that they are a “one-shot”
paiement and affect at the first place the return from filing a vacancy rather than the return from a
job match. As we will see in the next subsection, hiring subsidies will affect positively tightness in a
partial equilibrium analysis.
Equilibrium with Policy
The average wage resulting from Nash Bargain is given by
we = KJey
ÄKÂ1 ? ÂSL ? pÂS,c,JrÃeÃÃ? Â1 ? KÃÂXÄ1 ? hÂcÃÅ+ _ + pÂS,c,JrÃV ? 1ÃÅ
  #   The equilibrium condition for unemployment has the same expression than in the previous





ÄXÄ1 ? hÂcÃÅ+ _ + pÂS,c,JrÃVÂcÃÅÂ1 ? ts,hÃÂ1 ? KÃ + KÂSL ? pÂS,c,JrÃeÃ
ÄKÂ1 ? ÂSL ? pÂS,c,JrÃeÃÃ ? Â1 ? KÃÂXÄ1 ? hÂcÃÅ+ _ + pÂS,c,JrÃV ? 1ÃÅ
  #   
Â1 ? KÃÄ1 ? XÄ1 ? hÂcÃÅ? _ ? pÂS,c,JrÃVÅ ? KÂSL ? pÂS,c,JrÃeÃ ? Âr + sÃ
pÂS,c,JrÃ
KÂSL ? pÂS,c,JrÃeÃ = 0
  #   
chvÂcÃXvÄ1 ? hÂcÃÅ? pÂS,c,JrÃV = K
1 ? K ÂSL ? pÂS,c,JrÃeÃ   #   
Again, the system represented by equations ( ref: twentysix ), ( ref: twentyseven ) and
( ref: twentyeight ) is recursive, and again ( ref: twentyseven ) and ( ref: twentyeight ) can be solved
uniquely for S and c. Partial equilibrium comparative statics are summarized in table 1.
Table 1: Partial Equilibrium Comparative Statics
c SJ r we
s +++ +
e ? + ??
If we now turn to general equilibrium considerations, search subsidy stimulates search at the first
place. However, as it compensates for the search cost of the unemployed worker, it is going to make
her more selective in terms of job acceptance. Search subsidy might then raise worker’s reservation
productivity. These two elements have a contrasting effect on the transition rate from unemployment
to employment. In terms of trade externality, more search will be interpreted as a positive one by
firms. Their willingness to open up new vacancies is bigger. Nevertheless, firms might be reluctant
in doing so if the negative effect on the worker reservation productivity is too important.
As mentioned previously, hiring subsidy affects tightness condition at the first place by reducing
the cost of opening up a vacancy. This will also stimulate search as tightness and search are
positively linked because of the positive externality that a rise in tightness represents to searchers.
Nevertheless, hiring subsidy tends to lower the firms’ reservation productivity and subsequently, as
shown by equations ( ref: twentysix ) and ( ref: twentyfive ), to reduce both the equilibrium
reservation productivity and equilibrium wage. The latter effect discourages workers from searching
more as the return from extra search effort is smaller. It is true that a lower wage also reduces the
search cost, but it will be reduced by less than the return from extra search is reduced. As it is clear
from equation ( ref: twentyeight ), we might end up at equilibrium with a higher tightness level, but
with a lower search intensity.
In terms of  ref: fign  search subsidies make both the cÂSÃand the SÂcÃ curves flatter and shift
down, while hiring subsidies make them steeper and shift up. Hence some further conditions are
needed in order to define precisely changes in search and tightness equilibrium values. This is the
scope of subsection 4.2.In a Âu,vÃ space, a possible outcome of the introduction of one of the two policy instruments
here considered is shown in figure one. The UV curve shifts in while the VS curve shifts up. Both











The effects of policy instruments
Cost Effectiveness
The Budget Constraint
The definition of conditions for cost effectiveness to be obtained is necessary to assess the
relevance of the two policy instruments presented previously. The budget constraints for search
subsidies and hiring subsidies are respectively
Â_ + psÂS,c,JrÃVÃÂ1 ? tsÃus = tsÂ1 ? usÃ   #   
Â_Â1 ? thÃ + phÂS,c,JrÃeÃuh = thÂ1 ? uhÃ   #   
The subscripts introduced in the above equations refer to the particular equilibrium values
obtained in the two different policy schemes. Subscript s holds for the search subsidy scheme, and
subscript h for the hiring subsidy scheme. The absence of equilibrium wage w in the above equations
is due to the assumption that no exogenous public expenditures have to be financed. It is obvious
that in the presence of exogenous public expenditures the wage rate would play an important role in
terms of cost effectiveness.
It is straightforward to isolate ti, i = s,h, and then to compare its expression with the expression
of the equilibrium tax tb rate found for the benchmark economy. We obtain that
tb  ts if
ps  _
_ ? pbV   #   
and tb  th if
ph  _
_ ? Âpb + _sÃe
  #   If we look at the relation between the transition rate and the policy instrument, obtained by
strictly equating the left hand side with the right hand side of the above equations it is
straightforward to verify that
/ps
/V > 0a n d
/2ps




/e > 0a n d
/2ph
/e2 > 0f o re lying on the interval 0,
_
￿pb+_sˆ  footnote .
Proposition : If some conditions exist such that at equilibrium the transition rate is positively
affected by the introduction of a policy instrument, then cost effectiveness is obtained for some
positive values of the policy instrument.
The Transition Rate
In general, the effect of any parameter z on the worker’s transition rate is given by
/SqÂS,Jr,cÃ
/z












qS   #   
The three effects contained in the above expression are respectively the vacancy effect, the
search effect and the reservation-wage effect. As mentioned previously the first two operate through
the probability to make a contact while the last one operates through the rejection of a job offer. By
assuming that contact elements dominate the rejection element of the transition rate, and if
conditions under which both /S
/z and /c
/z have the same positive sign can be determined, it is then
possible to state cost effectiveness for a policy instrument scheme.
From previous analysis it is possible to concentrate on equations ( ref: twentyseven ) or
equivalently equation ( ref: twentytwo ) and ( ref: twentyeight ) to solve uniquely for S and c.U s i n g
the implicit function theorem, /S
/V > 0 is verified if
hvÂcÃvvÂ1 ? hÂcÃÃ
pÂS,c,JrÃÂ1 ? KÃS + ÄÂ1 ? RÂS,Jr,cÃÃÂr + sÃ ? pÂS,c,JrÃÅL




  #   
The term into brackets in the LHS of the above expression has to be positive. This is likely to
happen for value of K and L not too large. Condition ( ref: twentyeightd ) may be interpreted in the
following way. As long as the additional cost of extra search that an unemployed worker faces,
which means a lower wage claim, is higher than the additional wage cost that a firm would face if S
increases, search subsidy raises equilibrium tightness and equilibrium search footnote 
If Hosios’ efficiency condition footnote  is verified the latter term is equal to 1 and condition
( ref: twentyeightd ) reduces to
hvÂcÃvvÂ1 ? hÂcÃÃ > /pÂS,c,JrÃ
/c
V   #   
This is the condition for the LHS of equation ( ref: twentyeight ) to increase when search subsidy
is introduced.
Proposition : If condition ( ref: twentyeightd ) is verified then search subsidy will have a positive
impact on both search and tightness at equilibrium. By assuming that, referring to the transition
probability, contact elements dominate the rejection element, search subsidy will increase the
transition rate from unemployment to employment.
Similarly, /c
/e > 0 is verified ifÂr + sÃL K
Â1 ? KÃ







  #   
The interpretation of condition ( ref: cond1 ) is similar to the interpretation of condition
( ref: twentyeightd ) in the sense that as long as the return from higher tightness is higher than the
cost in terms of equilibrium wage, search will respond positively to hiring subsidy and subsequently
equilibrium tightness footnote .
Proposition : If condition ( ref: cond1 ) is verified then hiring subsidy will have a positive impact
on both search and tightness at equilibrium. By assuming that, referring to the transition
probability, contact elements dominate the rejection element, hiring subsidy will increase the
transition rate from unemployment to employment.
Optimal Values
In terms of cost effectiveness, the major effect for search subsidy will be observed when, in a
Âp,VÃspace , the slope of the curve characterizing equation ( ref: opt1 ) is equal to
( ref: twentyeightb ). For hiring subsidy a similar condition exists in the Âp,eÃ space.
If condition ( ref: twentyeightd ), respectively condition ( ref: cond1 ), is satisfied, in addition to
the assumption made previously, namely the dominance of the rejection element by the contact
elements of the transition rate, and to the constant returns of scale assumption, a concave
relationship corresponding to ( ref: twentyeightb ), starting from the point characterizing the
benchmark steady state, will be obtained in a Âp,zÃspace, z = V,e. This guarantees that the optimal
level of V, in terms of cost effectiveness, will be lying on the interval 0,
_
pb , respectively that the
optimal level of e will be lying on the interval 0,
_
￿pb+_sˆ .

























If what stated previously is verified, we need no additional conditions for these optimal values to
be positive.
Proposition : If condition ( ref: twentyeightd ), respectively condition ( ref: cond1 ), is satisfied,
it exists some optimal positive value of search subsidy, respectively hiring subsidy, in terms of cost
effectiveness. These values are given respectively by expressions ( ref: op1 ) and ( ref: op2 ) and
are lying on 0,
_
pb , respectively 0,
_
￿pb+_sˆ .





Cost effectiveness and Optimal values
The optimal value corresponds to the level of policy instrument that corresponds to the higher
value of p that can be obtained controlling for cost effectiveness. It does not unnecessarily
correspond to the lowest tax rate.
Efficiency Analysis
Productivity Distribution and Aggregate Efficiency
Productivity distribution is given by
Dt = pÂS,c,JrÃÄGÂJrÃ ? GÂminÂJr,JÃÃÅ
pÂS,c,JrÃÄ1 ? GÂJrÃÅ
  #   
The above expression computes the number of new matches with productivity less than or equal
to J at any point in time. It is straightforward to check that Dt integrates to one.
Using the fact that J is a non negative random variable, the average or expected productivity,




Ä1 ? DtÂJÃÅdJ   #   
Because labor is assumed to be the only factor of production in the economy, the Gross National
Output corresponds to the average output times the employment level. GNP is adjusted for the
disutility of unemployed workers’ search for jobs and weighted by the tax rate in order to evaluate
fully cost effectiveness. Hence, at equilibrium, it is given by
GNPadj = JeyÂ1 ? uÃ
t ? uhÂcÃÂ1 ? tÃw   #   
This measure of GNP allow an absolute assessment of the relative performance of the policy
instruments considered in the previous sections.
Computational ExerciseComputational Strategy
In order to get a tractable closed form solution for optimal c and J, and for equilibrium S and u,
some parameterization can be introduced. In addition, this would help us in providing “quantitative”
results. In our calibration exercise, the parameters of the model are r,_,t,e, the distribution gÂ.Ã and
the functions mÂ.Ã and VÂ.Ã.
The solution algorithm is obtained through the following steps footnote :
1.Solve system of equations ( ref: three ), ( ref: sixteen ),( ref: seventeen ) and ( ref: eighteen ) for
stationary values of Jr,c,S and u.
2.Solve for the stationary productivity distribution for the stationary values obtained in 1.
3.Iterate on steps 1 and 2 in order to reach a balanced government budget given respectively by
equations ( ref: bud1 ) and ( ref: bud2 ).
u,v and w are respectively the equilibrium unemployment rate, the equilibrium vacancy rate and
the equilibrium wage. A guess for the equilibrium tax rate t is made, and then step one is followed. If
the government is found to be running a surplus (deficit) as an outcome of step 1, the tax rate is
lowered (increased), and steps 1 and 2 are repeated until a balanced budget is achieved
Calibration
In this section I present the outcome of numerical resolution of the model with calibrated
parameters. This exercise only aims at quantifying the various trade offs presented in the pervious
sections. The parameters are chosen such that “plausible” results are obtained in the benchmark
economy. A time period of unit length is interpreted to be one quarter. The interest rate is set equal
to 0.015, implying an annual interest rate of 6%. The separation rate is fixed at s = 0.04,
corresponding to an average duration of a job of slightly more than six years. This relative high
figure becomes realistic once we take into account that quits and job-to-job movements are not
considered in the economy. The replacement ratio is set equal to 0.4. As I assume they are provided
for an infinite period of time unemployment benefits have to be given a broad definition that may
also include any kind of welfare transfers. This explains the relatively low replacement ratio taken
for computations. The matching technology is Cobb-Douglas, M = kÂcuÃ
av1?a,a n da is fixed at
0.6 footnote , and k = 0.67. I assumed that the imputed value of leisure time was proportional to the
wage rate. In the computations I assume that the imputed income is linear in leisure time with
coefficient equal to 0.8. The search cost function is increasing and convex in the search level, that is
hÂcÃ = Âb.cÃ
P, where b is set equal to 0.1 and P is set equal to 1.3. The equilibrium value of c will
then lie on the interval Ä0,10Å. The hiring cost parameter L is fixed at 0.3. The productivity
distribution gÂ.Ã is exponential with mean equal to 1. The maximum value that J can take is 8. It is
easy to check that it corresponds to a value for which GÂJÃ is only slightly different from 1. The
exponential function is log-concave. Log-concavity, as shown in Burdett cite: dueb  implies that the
hazard rate rises with an increase in job availability. This guarantees that both search and hiring
subsidies will increase transition rate p and lower the expected duration of unemployment. In terms
of equation ( ref: twentyeightb ), the right hand side has positive sign. Finally, K is set equal to 0.6 in
order to satisfy condition ( ref: nineteen ). This is done in order to avoid any bias that inefficiency, in
terms of trade externalities, could exacerbate once policy instruments are considered.
Results
Two general observations can be formulated. The first one is that cost effectiveness and higher
aggregate efficiency, as expected, are obtained for some values of both search and hiring subsidies.
The second one is that both policy instruments can have a strong positive effect on the level ofunemployment footnote . However, this occurs at a high cost, in particular under the hiring subsidy
scheme, in terms of both cost effectiveness and aggregate efficiency.
A more detailed analysis of table 2 of appendix C tells us that search subsidies tend to stimulate
search, to raise tightness and to lower the equilibrium reservation productivity while hiring subsidies
tend to raise tightness and to lower both search and reservation productivity ( see figure 1). Lower
reservation productivity levels observed under the search subsidy scheme reveal that, in this
particular calibration, workers tend to accept a larger cost in terms of leisure time than the transfer
they cash in. As the latter is cashed in only once a successful contact has been made, employment
becomes relatively more rewarding than unemployment when compared to the benchmark economy
conditions. This occurs despite the fall in the equilibrium wage. Hiring subsidies affect strongly
reservation productivity. Tightness’ increase does not stimulate search enough in order to
compensate for the dampening effect that lower reservation productivity has on search. For large
values of V and e (1.2 and 0.65 respectively) some perverse effects arise. Search intensity is lowered
suddenly and reservation productivity rises under the search subsidy scheme, and tightness decreases
suddenly under the hiring subsidy scheme. Under the search subsidy scheme leisure becomes “too
subsidized” as search cost falls dramatically. Under the hiring subsidy scheme, hiring becomes too
subsidized too. Vacancies jump ahead and the fall in search intensity becomes sharper compared
with lower level of hiring subsidy. The boosting effect on hiring makes the fall in equilibrium wage
less pronounced as well, making unemployment worth higher than for lower levels of subsidy.
If we now turn to results contained in table 3 of appendix C, optimal values for V and e,i nt e r m s
of cost effectiveness, can be set respectively at 0.3 and 0.1. At this “optimum”, equilibrium values
are sensibly different when comparing the two instruments. Unemployment is reduced by almost
1.3% under the search subsidy scheme while it is reduced by almost 1.2% under the hiring subsidy
scheme (see figure 2). Adjusted aggregate efficiency ÂgnpaÃ is 3% ahead with search subsidies and
2.5% with hiring subsidies. If we consider non-adjusted aggregate efficiency ÂgnpÃ, improvement at
optimal values of policy instruments are of same scale.
Once we do not control for cost effectiveness any more, then an important trade-off between
unemployment and aggregate efficiency appears. In figure 3, crosses refer to
ub
uv and dots to
gnpv
gnpb ,
where prime values indicate values obtained for a given policy instrument value and b subscript
values refer to benchmark values. When the two lines go up contemporarily, both unemployment
and aggregate efficiency are positively affected. This is true for some small values of both search
and hiring subsidies. When the two lines move in opposite directions, a trade-off between
unemployment and efficiency appears. This trade-off is more pronounced in the hiring subsidy
scheme footnote . When both lines decrease, the perverse effects mentioned above appear. This is
observed for relatively large values of the policy instruments.
As for the equilibrium wage, it falls dramatically when hiring subsidies are introduced. This is
due principally to the downward effect hiring subsidies have on the reservation productivity.
In this computational exercise efficiency condition ( ref: twentynine ) holds. As the contact part
of the transition rate is Cobb-Douglas, elasticity value is constant. This means that under both policy
schemes, results are optimal in terms of efficiency. However, both policy schemes lead to
underemployment, when new equilibrium values are related to benchmark ones. Underemployment
is measured by the relative fall in reservation productivity which is more pronounced under the
hiring subsidy scheme. Hence, subsidizing hiring tends to produce more underemployment than
subsidizing search as reflected by aggregate efficiency.
In the Âu,vÃ space, the VS curve shifts up slightly and the UV curve shifts in under both policy
schemes. Under the hiring subsidy scheme, the UV curve shifts in, as the shift-out effect of reduced
search intensity is more than compensated by the shift-in effect of lower reservation productivity.
The VS curve’s shift is less and less pronounced when search subsidies are considered, as its slope isdecreasing with the level of the search subsidy see appendix B . As for the slope of the VS curve,
when hiring subsidies are considered, it is increasing see appendix B . Hence, we observe that the
shift up of the later curve tends to be slightly more pronounced as the level of hiring subsidy
increases.
In this computational framework, reservation productivity plays a major role in the sense that the
impact it has on the transition probability is larger than the impact of the two elements entering the
matching function. This may be due principally to the particular form the distribution was given,
namely exponential. As pointed out in the introduction, hiring subsidies can create jobs “on their
own” however jobs creation is biased toward unemployment and can not be fully completed if
search behavior is not positively affected. It is also obvious that search subsidies are not able to
stimulate jobs creation directly. However by stimulating search and then by increasing the
subsequent trade externality, firms hiring willingness is stimulated indirectly. Hence search
subsidization is able to improve job creation without dampening search behavior. It is also clear that
the computational search environment chosen here is particular but it gives good insights in terms of
policy choice.
Conclusion
Targeted employment vouchers as defined in the Benefits Transfer Program, first elaborated by
Snower footnote , are usually attributed two major drawbacks, namely deadweight and displacement.
The former refers to the fact that some vouchers are paid to employees who would have been
employed without the existence of vouchers. The latter means that either employed or unemployed
workers who do not benefit from a policy scheme would be threaten in their status by unemployed
workers benefiting from the policy scheme. In existing policy schemes, like the UK Workstarts
scheme, long term unemployed become attractive to firms compared to short term unemployed or
employed workers. In the above sections, the framework adopted did not lead to heterogenous
groups of unemployed workers at equilibrium. Unemployed workers have a single common feature
at steady state which is to be unemployed. Search and hiring subsidies aim at preventing long term
unemployment from occurring, while BTP employment vouchers’type, at the first place, attempt to
reintegrate long term unemployed workers into the active part of the labor market. Thus deadweight
and displacement does not really have to be taken into account in assessing the relative performance
of search and hiring subsidies.
Rather than in supplementary terms the two kinds of instruments have to be thought in
complementary terms. On one hand search and hiring subsidies, considering that cost effectiveness
and aggregate efficiency’s gains are likely to be obtained in both schemes, are potentially good
instruments to deal the lack of both search and hiring incentives brought by unemployment benefits.
In our computational exercise, search subsidies are preferable in the sense that the trade-off between
unemployment and aggregate efficiency and underemployment is less important than for hiring
subsidies. On the other hand benefits transfers are a good way to allow long term unemployed
workers to come back to work.
Previous sections have shown that search and hiring subsidies are good instruments, with a
preference for search subsidies, to re-establish search and hiring incentives and by consequence to
curb unemployment. They are potentially cost effective and potentially aggregate efficiency
improvers. These characteristics make them competitive tools when compared to wage subsidies
which are usually assumed to be very effective in terms of employment but either very costly or
requiring some very specific and complex redistributive schemes.
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 appendix 
Vouchers and Equilibrium Values
Applying the implicit function theorem to system of equations  ref: twentyseven  and
 ref: twentyeight  it is tedious but straightforward to obtain conditions ( ref: twentyeightd ) and
( ref: cond1 ) for search subsidy and hiring subsidy respectively. The latter are sufficient conditions.
For search subsidy, as the numerator of the implicit function formula is always negative, that is
its opposite is always positive, the sign of /S
/V relies on condition ( ref: twentyeightd ). Numerator’s
opposite is given by
2Â1 ? KÃchvÂcÃvvÂ1 ? hÂcÃÃ+ V + Âr + sÃSL
pÂS,c,JrÃ
Moreover if condition ( ref: twentyeightd ) is satisfied, then from equation ( ref: twentyeight ),
/c
/V is necessarily positive.
This analysis can be pursued for hiring subsidy. Now opposite’s numerator is given by
K2
Â1 ? KÃ
Âr + s + pÂS,c,JrÃÃL ? K2
Â1 ? KÃ
pÂS,c,JrÃL
The above expression is always positive. /c
/e > 0 is verified, if condition ( ref: cond1 ) holds.
Again, it is easy to check from equation ( ref: twentyeight ) that /S
/e is necessarily positive.
Vouchers and the VS Curve
The relation between the slope of the VS curve and the value of search subsidy is given by
vKL 1
u2 + r + s
sÂ1 ? uÃ
2 ? V sÂ1 ? KÃ
u2
It is straightforward to see that the above expression decreases as value of V increases.
When hiring subsidy is introduced, this relation becomes
vKL
u2 + vÂr + sÃKL
sÂ1 ? uÃ
2 + e Ks
u2
Hence the slope is increasing with e.
Computational ResultsTable 2
B.E
S.S:0.1
S.S:0.3
S.S:0.5
S.S:0.9
S.S:1.2
H.S:0.1
H.S:0.3
H.S:0.5
H.S:0.65
c
2.8184
2.9955
3.3633
4.3523
6.7273
6.0931
2.6747
2.3076
1.8045
1.1516
S
0.5392
0.5461
0.5628
0.6269
0.8293
0.743
0.5566
0.6299
0.8021
1.0644
Jr
1.1567
1.1557
1.1469
1.1192
1.0124
1.0363
1.0151
0.7516
0.5483
0.4795
p
0.3065
0.3199
0.3505
0.4387
0.7089
0.6242
0.3466
0.4338
0.5052
0.4629
q
0.5684
0.5857
0.6224
0.6997
0.8548
0.8401
0.6227
0.6886
0.6298
0.4349
Table 3
B.E
S.S:0.1
S.S:0.3
S.S:0.5
S.S:0.9
S.S:1.2
H.S:0.1
H.S:0.3
H.S:0.5
H.S:0.65
u
11.54
11.12
10.25
8.36
5.34
6.02
10.35
8.44
5.88
7.95
v
6.22
6.07
5.77
5.24
4.43
4.47
5.76
5.32
5.88
8.87
wage
0.1310
0.1295
0.1258
0.1256
0.1118
0.1018
0.1091
0.096
0.0858
0.0861
gnp gnpa
1.1045 1.1018
1.1383 1.1356
1.1348 1.1319
1.0899 1.0866
1.0747 1.0714
0.8942 0.8689
1.1309 1.1291
1.0764 1.0753
1.0177 1.0171
0.9108 0.9105
t
0.08
0.078
0.079
0.084
0.088
0.105
0.0792
0.085
0.091
0.101